Since the mid-1980s microfinance has evolved rapidly in Mali 
Introduction
Mali, with a population of 11.7m, 70 percent rural, is located in the Sahel zone of West Africa. With a per capita income of US$245 and a Human Development Index rank of 174, it is among the poorest countries in the world, highly vulnerable to external impacts. Since the mid-1980s microfinance has evolved rapidly. The Parmec law, introduced in 1994, provides full recognition to financial cooperatives and renewable licensing to other types of microfinance institutions (MFIs). Prudential regulation applies to the whole sector, including an interest rate ceiling of at present 27 percent. Regulation and supervision are entrusted to a unit in the Ministry of Finance, CAS/SFD. As of 2003, the microfinance sector comprised 41 networks with 752 local MFIs and a total membership of 614,000, covering close to one-third of all families in Mali. In December 2004 the sector's total assets amounted to €69m 2 , total deposits of clients were €36m, and total loans outstanding €49m; the repayment rate was 94 percent.
The sector comprises three subsectors: cooperatives with 70 percent of total outreach, so-called village banks (caisses villageoises or CVECAs) with 20 percent, and solidarity credit groups in the Grameen tradition (credit solidaire in the Grameen tradition) with 10 percent. A major difference between these three sub-sectors is the emphasis placed on savings. In terms of total resources, these represent 57 percent among cooperatives, 39 percent among village banks and 27 percent among solidarity groups. The sector is highly concentrated: 88 percent of all deposits and 84 percent of all loans outstanding are in the cooperative subsector, and two-thirds of that in just two networks. The largest networks are Kafo Jiginew with 165 000 members and Nyesigiso with 127 500 members, accounting for almost half of total membership.
Mali has a small banking sector of nine banks. BNDA, the agricultural development bank, has been the main bank providing financial services to MFIs: through both forward linkages with MFIs and backward linkages with donor organization. As a channelling bank for funds provided by KfW (Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau), BNDA (2002:8) started refinancing MFIs in the Dogon area in 1986, one of the poorest areas in Mali. Since 1994, BNDA has acted as a wholesaling bank, offering primarily loans and deposits services to MFIs. By 2003, BNDA disbursements and commitments reached €5.6m and the loan portfolio stood at €4.65m. Its backward linkages with AFD (Agence Francaise de Developpement) and KfW cover almost half (47.5 percent) of its MFI portfolio; €1.75m were refinanced by AFD, €0.46m by KfW, totalling € 2.2m. Non-financial support, comprising funding for training of MFI staff and related forms of institution-building, are provided by BNDA as a channelling agency on behalf of AFD.
BNDA's portfolio is highly concentrated. The two largest borrowers are Kafo Jiginew (KJ) and CVECA-Office du Niger (one of the so-called caisses villageoises), each with a credit ceiling of €1.68m. The financial linkages between BNDA and these two borrowers were selected as case studies for the Ford/FAO linkage study and are described in detail below.
BNDA has largely abandoned retail lending, which it found too risky, and is now mainly a wholesale and corporate lender. Only 2.9 percent of its loans outstanding are invested in the microfinance sector (2003; down from 5.5 percent in 2000). The main reason for the decline is not a lack of willingness of the Bank to lend but a lack of effective demand (i.e. by creditworthy MFIs). The number of loans to MFIs has also declined from 70 to 56, and with such a small share of the business with MFIs and an interest rate of 8 percent (compared to a corporate rate of 15 percent), its microfinance operations are closer to social than commercial lending. Furthermore, no data is available to ascertain whether BNDA is breaking even or making a loss on its MFI lending.
Since 1994, BIM (Banque Internationale pour le Mali), a commercial bank, has entered the market, concentrating on three major networks. It is prepared to lend more, but faces the same shortage of effective demand. The banks have a highly effective system of loan protection, with a repayment rate of 100 percent, shifting all risks to within the networks. In 2003, a solidarity bank (BMS) designed as a bank for micro finance intermediaries, became operative, soon to be joined by a regional solidarity bank. It is expected that the increased supply of funds will not be matched by effective demand: the big cooperative networks adhere to a policy of self-reliance through deposit mobilization; most of the smaller networks and single units, with a shortage of loanable funds, are not creditworthy.
Quantitatively, the main overall function of financial linkages in Mali is liquidity balancing through deposits and borrowings. The MFIs need liquidity balancing over the course of the year, since their business is characterized by large seasonal fluctuations. Excess liquidity increases during the first half of the year and peaks in July, liquidity shortages increase during the second half of the year and peaks in December. The financial linkage with BNDA means that the MFI partners have both access to credit on demand and to a secure deposit house. This is exemplified by Kafo Jiginew, the largest network of financial cooperatives. Kafo uses BNDA credit lines mainly for liquidity balancing and donor funds for expanding their portfolio. A second model is expansion of the portfolio through bank borrowings, historically backed by donor funds. This is most clearly exemplified by the village banking network CVECA-ON. As illustrated in the example below the CVECA financial linkage model is motivated more by access to credit for portfolio expansion, than is it is for liquidity balancing. The underlying rationale for this is discussed in the last section of this article. KJ's financial strategy is explicitly geared to self-reliance on the basis of deposits and equity; these constituted, in December 2004, 80 percent of loans outstanding. Domestic bank borrowings are mainly used for liquidity balancing, 88 percent of it short-term, with wide seasonal fluctuations according to the agricultural cycle. Cotton, the main commodity, is harvested during the first months of the year and sold in the following months; most loans are repaid towards the middle of the year, marking a low in loans outstanding. Planting is done towards the end of the year; the turn of the year thus marks a peak in loans outstanding. During the planting and growing season, loans outstanding are up to twice the amount of the harvesting and marketing season, paralleled by variations in bank borrowings of a similar ratio, which constitute but a fraction of the portfolio. The variation in external borrowings follows the variation in loans outstanding with a time difference of 1-2 months. The lowest level of external borrowings is during the first part of the year, particularly March to July; the highest level is reached in December and January; the highest monthly volume of borrowings is €3.6m or 95 percent above the lowest, somewhat less than the differential in loans outstanding, indicating that a minor part of liquidity balancing is done from the network's own resources. As external borrowings are largely medium-term funds, short-term liquidity balancing is mostly done from domestic bank borrowings, which are mainly credit lines and short-term loans. (See graph 1) Interest rates vary between the village banks, and are fixed annually by the general assembly. The village banks treat internal and borrowed funds separately. Loans from internal sources (43 percent of the portfolio) are used mainly for small trade, horticulture and livestock, and carry rates of 20 -25 percent. Loans refinanced by BNDA takes two forms -input loans (57 percent of the portfolio in 2003) at a flat rate of 12 percent, and loans for planting paddy at 20 -25 percent.
Penalties are stiff, at 1 to 3 percent per day overdue. The village banks and its members are aware what that BNDA is the source of their refinanced loans, and are very keen to repay on time not to sacrifice their creditworthiness. New loans are only issued after full repayment, which means that 100 percent repayment is the rule. Actually, the repayment problem is only shifted to inside the network. This seemingly good practice could lead to a domino effect of non-repayment.
BNDA Niono acts as the central fund for the unions. Bank deposits are remunerated at 3.5 percent, except sight deposits. The village banks offer sight deposits which are not remunerated and not used as loanable funds; term deposits at 5-10 percent and ROSCA savings at 3-5 percent. BNDA disburses cash loans to the account of each union and from there automatically to the sub-accounts of the village banks. Loans in kind for inputs are disbursed directly to the traders after delivery of the fertilizer to the village banks for distribution to the end-borrower.
Loan processing involves the following steps: The village bank members indicate their demands, regardless of source of funds. These are checked and, if approved, processed by the credit committee. Joint liability forms are signed by the members. The committee, together with the cashier and the controller, decides which loans (i.e., for diverse purposes) are to be financed from internal resources and which loans (i.e., for inputs and labour costs of planting rice seedlings) are to be financed from bank borrowings. For loans from external resources, creditworthiness examinations and the preparations of documents are more thorough, which also has a positive effect on the examination of loans from internal resources. For the bank borrowings, the committee prepares a loan request to the union; the whole process takes about two days. The administrative council of the union analyses the requests and prepares its own request for a loan from BNDA, which takes about two days. The request together with the report on the loan examinations, the lists of the individual members and their indebtedness, and the financial standing of the village banks (defaults must not exceed 5 percent) are checked by CAREC; this takes the involvement of two staff members for two days. The approved loan applications are submitted to the BNDA branch at Niono, together with a commission of €2.30 per union. The BNDA branch in Niono processes the applications and approves the loans.
The procedure differs for loans-in cash and loans-in-kind. Cash loans, e.g., for labour, are disbursed by BNDA in tranches to the account of each union, from which the sub-loans are automatically transferred to the sub-accounts of the village banks, which in turn credit the loans to the members' accounts in the village bank. In the cases of input loans in kind, traders deliver the fertilizer to the village banks as distributors and obtain a signed receipt, which is cashed at the BNDA branch and debited to the accounts of the unions and sub-accounts of the village banks. 
Remaining issues and challenges
The different players in the Mali microfinance linkages have all benefited from the financial linkage. The managing director of CAREC, speaking on behalf of the village banks, states that: "Our outreach is fully due to the availability of bank refinance". For BNDA a major advantage of working through the village banking network has been that, in contrast to former schemes of retail lending with their high default rates, the bank is now experiencing full repayment on time. However, the number of MFI clients is negligible, and account for only 2.9 percent of BNDA's disbursements. At the same time, from the viewpoint of the target population, the new credit discipline is increasingly reaching marginal clients who would previously have defaulted on individual loans from BNDA and become unbankable.
On the impact side three key effects are observed: There is a substantial increase in overall outreach, the credit portfolio is performing satisfactory and there seem to be increased coverage of marginal clients. There are, however, a number of challenges at the village bank level that remains.
There seem to be a striking difference between CVECA-ON, which links up with banks to expand its portfolio, and Kafo Jiginew, which uses bank funds just for liquidity balancing? What seem to be the impact of this difference in strategies on growth in terms of savings mobilization and loans outstanding? Chao-Béroff (2003:16-17) , spiritus rector of village banking in Mali through CIDR, raises the same issue by asking "Mobilizing Rural Savings to Reinforce the MFI or to Reinforce the Client?" She tentatively concludes that there is a "lack of incentive mechanisms and adapted products… the highest performing MFIs should be encouraged to develop and market (this type of savings). In rural areas, savings for productive self-financing has a future, especially as a financing mechanism for agricultural activities." This is indeed the conclusion to be drawn from comparing the two networks.
Finally, it is interesting to reflect on the temporary versus permanent nature of these linkages. We may ask: After twenty years of bank linkages, will backward linkages with donors become superfluous, if not hazardous? With BIM willing to lend more to MFIs but meeting a limited demand, and BMS newly entering the market as the designated bank of MFIs; are donor credit lines still needed to refinance BNDA? It appears that they have played an important role in the first stage of the evolution of microfinance in Mali. They may now be taken over by domestic banks, marking the second stage of evolution. Given the availability of additional loan funds from national banks in Mali and the risk of a devaluation, it is questionable whether hard currency loans, a substitute for domestic resources, made attractive by a lower interest rate are still good policy. The coming of the third, and ultimate, stage has already been announced: the establishment of a bank of its own by the largest network of MFIs, and thus the incorporation of linkages within that apex institution.
